Why Russophobia shapes Russian foreign policy
Understanding Putin's KGB mindset
I was pleased to meet Alexander Vassiliev, who now lives in the UK, but was formerly a KGB Intelligence Officer in the American Department of First Chief Directorate. He provides a fascinating and unique picture of the Russian mindset in espionage and foreign policy.
We discussed Russophobia in the UK and how it dates back at least two centuries, and how it remains a guiding principle of British foreign policy. The war in Ukraine offers a good illustration of this. NATO has long been a stated redline for Russia although one can debate the wisdom of Putin’s decision to launch an invasion, which shocked Alexander at the time.
Boris Johnson’s role in encouraging Zelensky to reject the Istanbul Peace Deal and turn himself into a modern-day Churchill makes sense in the context of British Russophobia.
And yet for centuries, UK soft power through literature and music has been a powerful force in Russia, including during Soviet times.
Nevertheless, Britain is never far from being viewed in Moscow as bent on its defeat, a feeling reinforced by the 1998 publication of information about ‘Operation Unthinkable’ a UK war game scenario in which Britain and America would attack Soviet forces in Europe after the end of World War II.
Britain today doesn’t understand what drives Russian foreign policy thinking and yet understanding a country is vital to effective espionage and, in turn, foreign policy development.
Alexander spoke about how this was a mindset reinforced in KGB spy school which he joined as Vladimir Putin was graduating. All of the KGB spies in Britain were anglophiles, including Alexander Lebedev. He speaks about his joining KGB spy school as Vladimir Putin was graduating.
KGB agents didn’t spent their time talking about ideology – it was all about business. The KGB wasn’t bent on regime change – it was about understanding motives and intentions in foreign policy domain and obtaining access to scientific and technological secrets.
The failure to understand what drives Soviet and later Russian thinking helps to explain the foreign policy failure that is the war in Ukraine. A good chance to normalise Soviet-Western relations was missed during 70s following agreement of the Helsinki Accords.
A key failure in western understanding is that Putin is a moderate within the Russian system, however he is caricatured in the western mainstream media. Putin as an ex- KGB intelligence officer tries to maintain relations with everyone, if only to influence them.
Alexander argues that Putin is in fact the most pro-western Russian leader since Lenin and yet the UK and America have managed to ‘screw it up’. Putin’s future replacement may well be more hardline.
In the context of the Ukraine war, the collective west won by turning two previously close Slavic nations against each other. However, Russia’s game now is to bleed Europe dry and sow political division which is precisely what is happening. The Ukraine war is horrible but NATO membership unacceptable.
He suggests that the Idea of independent Ukraine was always an anti-Russian concept advanced by the CIA and MI6. Even Zelensky’s modern Ukrainian identity is confected. What is clear that a Ukraine that can’t be friendly with Russia spells doom for Europe as a whole. Yet London’s secret warriors are bent on the defeat of Russia at any cost.