Ukraine could be broke by 2026, even if war ends tomorrow
There's a gaping hole in Kyiv’s finances that no amount of tax increases or Western donations will be able to fill
I recently published the piece below in Responsible Statecraft. The Paris Summit on 27 March produced nothing that indicated European leaders are focused on the issue of longer-term funding. This is worrying, not least as the Paris Summit appeared designed to prolong, not end, the war. Do the Europeans still have their collective heads in the sand?
I hope you find my article interesting!
BEGINS
There is no plan in place to fund the Ukrainian budget after 2025.
Even if the war ends by the summer of 2025, it will take some time to reduce military expenditures, leaving European nations on the hook. It’s not clear that European elites have fully understood the political costs, however much longer the war continues.
With intensive, U.S.-brokered negotiations ongoing in Saudi Arabia involving separate Ukrainian and Russian delegations, hopes are rising that the Trump administration will finally be able to bring an end to the war.
But even if the war ends tomorrow, it would be unwise to assume that Ukraine could reduce military spending close to prewar levels.
Ukraine now has almost 900,000 men and women at arms, a threefold increase from peacetime, and that doesn’t take into account irrecoverable losses through death and injury. Estimates vary widely, but the casualty rate is commonly thought to number in the hundreds of thousands, with compensation provided to the injured and families of the deceased.
The war in Ukraine has therefore come at a vast financial cost to that country. Ukraine’s defense spending has risen tenfold since the 2021 budget was announced, when social welfare payments were the country’s biggest expenditure.
This has left a gaping hole in Ukraine’s finances that no amount of tax increases or Western donations will be able to fill over a sustained period without political consequences.
Since 2022, Ukraine has run an average budget deficit of over 22% of GDP. Based on the current exchange rate, Ukraine’s budget shortfall in 2025 amounts to around $41.5 billion. And that assumes defense spending falling slightly this year. In the hopefully unlikely event that war continues to the end of the year, the Ukrainian state would need to revise its budget upwards as it did in 2024.
Today, Ukraine’s domestic revenue, including taxes, excise, and duties, just about covers the cost of the defense effort, which in 2024 accounted for 64% of its total budget expenditure. That includes significant tax increases as the war has gone on. Total tax revenue will have risen by more than 100% since the war started and personal income taxes by over 200%. This in a country in which, according to the Wilson Center, 50% of the population lives at a basic subsistence level.
As Ukraine is cut off from international capital markets, it has had to meet the difference through aid and loans from Western nations.
Put simply, Western donations and loans have paid the salaries of Ukrainian state officials and kept the lights on in their buildings. At the start of the war, donations took the form of free financial aid to meet the country’s budgetary and military needs. According to the Kiel Institute, the United States has provided just above $50 billion in direct budgetary assistance. The European Union provided $51.5 billion in financial assistance – i.e., budgetary support – between 2022 and 2024.
However, since the start of 2024, free aid has progressively shifted to lending as Western governments have felt the political and economic cost of unlimited financial assistance.
So, Ukraine has increasingly resorted to borrowing money. In some regards, that is to be expected. Governments tend to borrow heavily at times of war. The UK only settled its World War II war debts to the United States and Canada in 2006.
Ukrainian debt has therefore soared to over 100% of GDP and, critically, the cost of servicing its debt has tripled, and now makes up the second largest line of expenditure in Ukraine’s budget, after military spending. To put that into context, Ukraine will spend more than twice the amount on servicing its debt in 2025 than it spends on the health of its population. That ratio will only widen the longer the war continues.
Ukraine should just about be able to make ends meet in 2025 thanks to the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan agreed in June 2024. As part of a last-ditch compromise by the outgoing Biden Administration, the $20 billion U.S. contribution to the G7 loan was directed through the World Bank to provide specific project-based support – i.e., to help rebuild power infrastructure - rather than generalized budgetary support.
The crucial point is that I’ve seen no plans for how Ukraine’s budgetary needs will be met from 2026 onward. Even if the war ends tomorrow, Ukraine may still be at risk of running out of money in 2026 if Western donor countries falsely assume that it will be able to return to prewar spending on Day One.
Therefore, the big question is how quickly Ukraine can reduce military spending in 2026 and who will cover the shortfall. To balance the books in 2026, Ukraine would need to reduce its military spending by 80%, or around $41 billion.
But decision-makers in Kyiv may understandably push to maintain a big army against the threat of future Russian aggression. While the huge expenditure in weapons and ammunition from war fighting may fall away, maintaining a standing army, even if its numbers are reduced, would still carry a heavy price. Even if Ukraine’s future budget deficit wasn’t as high as $41 billion, it is easy to imagine that it might be $20 billion.
The International Monetary Fund also doesn’t expect Ukraine to be able to access international lending markets before 2027. That will leave the Ukrainian state reaching out to donor nations for additional funding. With the Trump administration looking to pare back its financial commitments to Ukraine and focus instead on investing, including in minerals, the pressure will be on European states.
There is significant political risk here. In the past few days, the Europeans struggled to agree to an additional weapons package of $5 billion for Ukraine. Funding $20 billion in budgetary support to Ukraine in 2026 following a ceasefire this year may still herald a backlash from those on the nationalist left and right who believe the war should have ended in 2022. I assess the UK and Europe would find it economically and politically unsustainable to prop up the war beyond this year without the United States. That’s another reason why European leaders should get behind ongoing peace negotiations.
It is clear that on many levels neither the US, nor Europe ever considered the consequences of this war. Ukraine will never be able to return to its former state or recover from this conflict. As predicted by Prof. Meirsheimer, it will simply turn into a dysfunctional rump state. Its resources will be plundered and pillaged by transnational banks and corporations from countries who will inevitably demand some form of repayment for the money they poured into this war, and the remaining Ukrainian population will only get poorer and poorer trying to service the IMF and other debt.
It is delusional to think that Ukraine's issues will stay in Ukraine. Firstly, many European countries accepted millions of Ukrainian refugees and migrants most of which do not have any plans to return to Ukraine. Secondly, it is inevitable that many of those, who happen to survive the conflict will eventually seek to reunite with their families who settled in Europe after 2022, and it is highly unlikely that they will be looking to do that in their destroyed homeland, which offers them and their children no prospects. So, thousands of mentally and physically broken soldiers will come to Europe to join their families and only God knows whether they will ever be able to recover from the conflict and contribute anything to the societies they would be looking to become a part of or whether they would instead become a permanent burden on Europe's taxpayers for the rest of their lives. So, the cost of this conflict will be much wider and much more painful than the Ukrainian budget beyond 2026 and Europe needs to prepare for supporting Ukrainian refugees and their families beyond Ukraine's borders. I doubt that this is even being discussed among Europe's leadership, let alone that any preparations are happening!
Last year, the Germans published some stats related to the Ukrainians learning German. According to those stats, nearly 70% of Ukrainians either abandoned German language courses or did not put the required effort into learning the language, failed to turn up to classes, exams etc. Remember, this is in a context, where those courses are being funded by the German government and offered to Ukrainians free of charge! As you can see, this shows low interest among Ukrainians to integrate into German society even on a basic level, let alone start contributing anything to it! Has the German government ever considered the cost of millions of the so called refugees from Ukraine never even trying to integrate into their economy? Yes, they do have plans to cut their benefits to force them to work but what is going to be the success of that if the people you are hoping to force to work don't even speak your language and have no desire to learn it? What if many of them to choose to turn to crime instead? Who considered the cost of that? Nobody!
What is to say that other European countries do not have exactly the same or very similar issues? Nothing!
Even where Ukrainians do get jobs and pay taxes, most of the time the jobs they get are low paid and therefore the taxes they pay do not cover what they require from the system to educate their children, provide their healthcare etc, etc...
So, Europe will be dealing with the consequences of this war for a long, long time to come and it will be without the benefit of cheap Russian resources driving economic miracles like post 1960s Germany's!
Thank you very much for your articles and interviews.
It is surprising that these seemingly most important questions: what will happen to Ukraine and what is happening to Ukraine - are not discussed in the UK. Neither is Britain's (and Europe's) strategy towards Russia and Ukraine in general. (Seems to me that even with regard to the US on the eve of big changes - not much discussion.) Individual dissenters exist (like you or Lord Skidelsky, for example, and I don't even know who else to name...), but the unanimity in society seems unbreakable so far.
At the same time, non-political people have a slightly different take on the issue: ‘it's a war between Russia and the US, but we (Britain) are running ahead of the locomotive as usual. If it weren't for nuclear weapons, we'd be fighting the Great War by now. And in general we don't believe anyone, everyone lies.’
Why do you think there are so critically few dissidents on this issue? If I may quote you (I am writing an article about British dissidents for Novaya Gazeta, Moscow). You have spoken many times about ‘state propaganda’, but this term can only be applied to the BBC, but where is the other view of the rest of the press?
I would be very grateful for your reply - if not for quotation, then just for my understanding.