Why western sanctions against Russia have failed and become self-defeating

I recently participated in a debate in London about the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. I argued that they have proven ineffective as a tool of foreign policy, and kept my remarks focussed on Russia, which is the most sanctioned country on the planet, with over 20,000 sanctions imposed so far.

For good or ill, I argued that sanctions were ineffective from a position of having authorised around half of the UK sanctions against Russia after war broke out in 2022. I take no great pride in that, but that was my job at the time and I eventually left my career as a British diplomat in 2023, largely out of a sense that UK foreign policy was failing in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, it worries me that so few people appear focused on what we in the UK want the sanctions to achieve, to the point where they have become an end in themselves. Yet, look at the legislation, specifically the Russia Sanctions Regulations of 2019, and the purpose is quiet clear:

Encourage Russia to cease actions de-stablising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine.

More than eleven years since the onset of the Ukraine crisis and not far from four years since war broke out, the UK and its allies have manifestly failed to deliver upon that goal.

We have been through eleven years of gradually ramping up sanctions against Russia only to see Russia increase its resistance, and then to launch its so called Special Military Operation in 2022.

Since 2022, 5.9 million people have fled Ukraine, 3.7 million have been internally displaced, 1.3 million people have keen killed or injured including civilians and children.

Sanctions did not prevent that. One might argue that they helped to precipitate it.

Ukraine is bankrupt, its cities broken, its energy infrastructure once again subject to nightly bombardment as the winter approaches and people wonder whether they’ll be able to heat their homes.

Sanctions are not preventing this.

Yet at the debate, my opponents somehow advanced the argument that sanctions remain an effective tool of foreign policy, from the comfort of a grand hall, two thousand miles away from the front line, even further from responsibility, and completely detached from reality.

In my mind, there are two clear reasons why sanctions policy has failed.

Firstly, because even if people in the west consider them to be justified, the Russian State considers them to be unjust.

Ever since the Minsk II peace deal was subordinated to sanctions in March 2015, President Putin has become increasingly convinced that western nations would sanction Russia come what May.

And that has proved to be the case.

Every time an inevitable new package of sanctions is imposed the UK, Europe or others, it also convinces ordinary Russian people that this is true.

People in the west might hate Putin, but he is far more popular in Russia than Keir Starmer is in Britain, or than Friedrich Merz is in Berlin, or than Emmanuel Macron is in France.

So the idea that sanctions undermine support in Russia for President Putin is deeply misguided.

Likewise, sanctioning British based Russian billionaires who took their assets out of Russia might play well in the Financial Times but is a meaningless gesture; these figures have no real power in Russia.

The idea that if we sanction Roman Abramovich he might some how rise up and try to unseat Putin together with other oligarchs is a fantasy.

The Russian oligarch Oleg Tinkoff who took to Instagram after the war started to criticise the Russian army, was forced to sell his eponymous bank and yet the UK still sanctioned him.

Why would any wealthy Russian on that basis stand up rise up against President Putin on the west’s behalf only to get sanctioned by us anyway?

Yet, we have sanctioned 2000 individuals and entities, banning them from travel to the UK, even though 92% of them never had before the war started. These, I’m afraid, are empty gestures.

Sanctions will not stop the war.

And the longer they go on, more Ukrainians will die.

Despite Russia having done everything to adjust to sanctions since 2014, commentators in the west nevertheless try to tell you that, well, maybe we should have imposed more sanctions at the start for a bigger effect.

But on my second point, that denies the political reality of how sanctions are imposed.

While the combined economies of NATO are 27 times bigger than Russia, 32 states cannot coordinate policy quickly enough to take decisive action.

This results in waging war by committee.

Imagine if you will a chess board with President Putin staring across at a team of thirty two people on the other side, squabbling loudly among themselves for months on end before deciding not to make the best move.

If you believe that Europe is about to become a rapid decision making body now at a time when its member states are increasingly turning to nationalist political parties who resent the war policy in Brussels, then my message to you is, good luck waiting for that.

Europe has now been debating for over a year whether to expropriate 200 billion in Russian assets housed in Belgium.

Yet that has not been agreed precisely because the Belgian government has blocked it consistently out of a not illegitimate fear that it will shred that’s country’s reputation among international investors at a time when new financial architecture is being constructed in the developing world.

Meanwhile, Russia’s foreign exchange reserves have continued to grow and now stand at over $700 billion for the first time. So even at this late stage if Europe chose to expropriate the assets, Russia could live without them.

Rather than being forced to the negotiating table – the complete fantasy that proponents of this hair-brained idea would tell you – Russia would be so enraged by what it sees as theft that it would keep on fighting.

And more Ukrainians would die.

President Putin is not hemmed in by the need to consult, and western indecision gives him time to adapt.

Since 2014, Russia’s economy has reoriented away from its dependence on the west, precisely to limit the impact of sanctions.

When war broke out in 2022, Russia had been adapting to sanctions for 8 years already.

Even though the scale was unprecedented, Russia had already prepared itself for the onslaught when it happened and has adapted better.

In 2022, with everyone crowing about the crashing rouble, Russia pulled in its biggest ever current account surplus of over $230 billion which, by the way, is bigger than Ukraine’s whole economy.

Despite cutting off gas supplies and bearing down on shadow tankers, Russia to this day continues to pull in hefty trade surpluses each year. It has not been in deficit since 1998.

Lots of people argued that if we had gone all in in 2014, then that might have made a difference. But believe we, that was debated in Europe, and no one could agree to it.

And I wonder whether, had it been agreed, Europe would simply have faced the political and economic turmoil it is currently going now, ten years earlier.

So let’s stop talking about what ifs.

The ugly truth is that sanctions have become an end in themselves. They are not a strategy, but a fig leaf covering the embarrassing fact that the west does not have a strategy.

They are a weak alternative to war or peace that serve no purpose other than to prolong the war in Ukraine.

Western nations have shown themselves unwilling to contemplate diplomacy. Talking to Putin is dismissed as a prize that will take him out of international isolation; even though he only appears isolated by western nations. Yet diplomacy isn’t about talking to your friends, despite the never ending round of back slapping summits our leaders attend. Diplomacy is about talking to the people with whom you most disagree. We have refused to talk to Russia and continue to avoid diplomacy at all costs to this day.

Neither do we want war,

Britain’s army today has 73,000 soldiers, 2,000 fewer than 2 years ago. Russia has 600,000 troops in Ukraine, apparently. We couldn’t even agree to send 10,000 troops as part of a so-called reassurance force although, to be honest, that idea didn’t reassure me at all.

Russia is outstripping us in the production of munitions, tanks and naval warships. And it has 6000 nuclear warheads.

So I’m glad we don’t want war either.

But as we continue to pursue ever diminishing packages of sanctions, Ukraine will remain stuck in the middle, devastated and depopulated, as Europe deindustrialises and falls into the embrace of nationalism at an accelerating rate.

Meanwhile, despite obvious headwinds, Russia’s economy appears in better shape that ours. It would be impossible to claim that there had been no economic impacts on the Russian economy from sanctions. Yet with economic links to the western now all but destroyed, sanctions relief is less important to Russia than it is to Europe.

In Budapest recently I got talking to a member of the House of Lords and former Diplomatic Service colleague who is a close friend of Boris Johnson. During his speech he remarked that sanctions on Russia have had no impact at all.

Later over drinks we discussed this and he agreed with the arguments that I have put forward today. But then he paused, and said ‘ah, but you just can’t say that in Britain though’.

It’s time to wake up and realise the terrible mess we have got ourselves into through sanctions. Sanctions have failed to the great detriment of Ukraine. It’s time, finally, to get back diplomacy.